Too Few Troops in Afghanistan

There has been a great deal of controversy over the very small number of real infantry troops sent to southern Afghanistan, a point that was highlighted on this blog by one former paratrooper back in January. Even so former defence chiefs were shocked by the actual numbers of boots on the ground when they were briefed on the Afghan deployment by the current Chief of Defence Staff Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup a few weeks back. One of them went so far as to dub it a “mission impossible”.

Afghanistan is going to take far longer than Iraq. But we simply don’t have enough infantry in the British Army to keep the two operations going properly, so we are doing Afghanistan with too few troops. Blair promised Bush that once Iraq was over, the British would leave Iraq to the Americans and the Brits would take the lead in a Nato expansion in Afghanistan. That was all based on the highly optimistic Bush/Blair expectations of what would happen in Iraq. The aftermath of the war there changed the situation and it will take time for British troops to disengage but Blair has kept his promise.

During the Nato negotiations as to who would join the British in Afghanistan, the then Defence Secretary John Reid insisted that the UK would not supply more than 3,300 troops. This was always a ridiculous position to adopt and the MoD now couches all defences of the numbers sent with the caveat that it will keep force levels under review and change them where necessary. Given that no military commander would be happy having just 750 infantry to patrol an area the size of Wales, I think we can take those assurances with a very large pinch of salt.

The package that was put together is repeatedly described as robust but those 3,300 troops contain only one infantry battalion – 600 men in total but actually quite a bit less than 600 actual war-fighting soldiers or "bayonets" as they are known in army parlance, once the headquarters elements are removed, plus company of 150 Gurkhas – good guys to have around but far too few of them.

The military planners had originally wanted to send in two infantry battalions, plus an artillery regiment re-roled as infantry, and a company of armoured infantry with Warrior armoured vehicles. That was vetoed, in part because the overstretch of our infantry would not allow it and partly because it would make what was supposed to be a peacekeeping “hearts and minds” operation look far too offensive.

The trouble is of course that it has turned very, very offensive. In mid May, the Taliban began a major offensive against the British and Canadian troops who have recently arrived in the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar to replace American troops. The MoD has claimed that the most successful contact, two weeks ago, when British troops killed 21 Taliban, was the first time the paratroopers fired their weapons in anger. But in fact there are daily contacts going on and with so few boots on the ground there is far more chance of British soldiers being killed.

The problem is not helped by the peacekeeping rules of engagement they have been given, which as one soldier told the BBC, prevent them firing until a Taliban fighter aims his weapon at them. It was often impossible to tell who was an innocent civilian and who was a Taliban fighter, until they actually aimed their weapon at you, Pte Paul Gordon said. "In some instances they would come out, someone who you would think was a civilian and then in a blink of an eye they would draw out a weapon. As soon as they drew them into the aim that’s when you would engage so it’s very restrictive."

Sadly the first para to die in operations in Helmand, Captain Ian Philippson, was killed last Sunday. There will be more. The men of 3 Para have been warned to expect casualties on a similar scale to those the battalion experienced in the Falklands when they lost 23 dead and 50 wounded taking Mount Longden. The dead included Sgt Ian McKay who won a posthumous VC after continuing up the mountain alone when all his men were killed or wounded around him. His body was found on the top of Mt Longden surrounded by dead Argentinians. A very brave man but it would be good to get out of this one without any posthumous VCs.

Comments

[ANTONIO GUERRA]

Your MoD is comiting the same mistake that our Bush Bunch made when they ignored recomendations of the top brass and invaded Iraq with far fewer troops than were actually needed. We have paid dearly for that mistake with thousands of casualties and a post-invasion Iraq in chaos. Sad that your policy makers have learned nothing from this.

Antonio Guerra
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, USA

[Chuck Unsworth]

A weary sense of deja vu here. This danger was discussed some months ago on (or in) Mick's blog. On a point of minor detail, in Britain the MoD does not make the political decision to go to war. And there are several other more complex constitutional aspects which perhaps should be debated elsewhere.

My concern is that those currently operating in Iraq are now to move to a very different territory and type of war. I suppose that some will say - probably rightly - that British troops are highly professional and superbly trained. Fatigue penalises any military force. We should remember that since Tony Blair came to power British troops have been almost constantly involved in one war or another. Moving our troops from Iraq to Afghanistan to relieve American forces is a distasteful reminder of the political reality.

This is such difficult terrain. The opposition has spent many years honing its skills, more recently fighting the Russians (no pushover) and subsequently the Americans and NATO. They are completely conversant in fighting guerilla actions. This is their home territory. For centuries Afghanistan and the surrounding countries have been an unstable, lawless and violent battlefield.

The lack of clarity as to the mission aims and objectives - Reid's myopic vision and incredibly poor political directive, the farcically limited resources, and the messy interface with others (notably the American contingent) do not bode well.

To be brutally frank I have been depressed by the gung ho comment emanating from some of the senior officers currently on the ground. I do hope that those Staff Officers who are responsible for present strategy have carefully studied their military history - notably of (the all too many) previous British actions on exactly the same ground. Some of those earlier actions have particularly telling messages for the current British force.

[Lt Col (retd) Premendra Singh [Corps of EME, Indian Army ]]

Sir,
Wish we were there too ! I have right in front of me, my great Grandfather Subedar Sant Singh's [ 23 Sikh Pioneers Regt - he joined on 18 March 1858 as per the Army List] medals in original. It includes the Afghanistan medal 1878 with clasps 'Kabul' and 'Ali Musjid'. The medal shows a somewhat morose looking elephant carrying cannon [would you like to have a photo Sir ? ]. As the Afghans don't much seem to notice who carries guns into their territory - helicopter gunships or horses, one hopes an imaginative design for a new Afghanistan medal comes up. There is the somewhat apocryphal story of the Afghan Chief in London in the 1890's annoyed at the British Lieutenant wearing an Afghan medal - his complaint being that he should have got the medal too, as he was right in the thick of the fighting also. So an approval of the 'Kabuli wallahs' may also be in order before finalising designs. By the way India Gate in Delhi lists a large number of British and Indian soldiers killed in the 3rd Afghan War - I have the complete list. Where are the current lot of casualties going to be listed ? Land in South Delhi close to the old Delhi Memorial is available at about GBP 2000 per sq yard and if we do join in it might be in order to collaborate in an overdue Raj redo for old times sake. Finally I've just found that a retd RAF officer in France, a medal collector, has the medals of the second Subedar of GGF's Regt. Small world. Maybe one of these days we shall together present the two medal sets to the Regimental Centre in Fatehgarh India. Regards.

[Mick says: Thank you very much for this excellent post. I would love to see a photo.]

[Chuck Unsworth]

And my apologies to Col Singh for failing in my earlier comment to mention his forbears' tremendous courage and fortitude throughout the previous Afghan wars. It would be of interest to many, I think, to have sight of the picture. Maybe Mick can be prevailed upon to post it here - or at least a link.

Horses, mules and elephants have all played their part in moving artillery pieces. In this terrain sometimes even the most modern machinery has proved fallible. The mule however, continues to provide a reliable means of transport.

The Delhi Gate stands as a substantial and very moving monument to the fallen. Let's pray that no further names are added to the rolls, but I fear that Col Singh may well be right to consider the possibility.

[dave]

CHUCK
Reid, a completely contemptible individual, was just a spokesman for the decision-maker. BLAIR.

Colonel Singh 'seems' to regard this as a sporting event. John Masters tells us also that

"many Pathans used to apply to the Political Agents for the Frontier Medal with the appropriate clasp. I think their request was reasonable. As they pointed out, they were British subjects and they had fought in the battles so thoughtfully organised by the King Emperor Across the Seas. Indeed, without their co-operation the war would have been a complete fiasco and no one would have got ANY medals. "

Tongue out of cheek, I hope they get lots of useful experience, and medals, and come home to defend us from the Germans. Whoops,wrong war. The Russkies ? Wrong again.
Cocaine, perhaps ?

Well, wot the hell, they have a lousy job with no clear objective, dumped upon them by the UNDESCRIBABLE BLAIR, and I wish them all safe home again.