Nimrod - The Warnings the MoD Ignored

Regular readers of this blog will not have been surprised by the furore over fuel leaks on board the RAF Nimrod spy plane XV230 which exploded over Afghanistan in September last year, killing all 14 on board. The emails, which showed the concerns of middle-ranking RAF officers over the leaks, are only a small piece of the picture that has emerged of problems with the aircraft, which was due to go out of service in 1995 and will not be replaced – under current plans – until 2010.

As far back as early 2003 - with the Nimrods already carrying out a heavy workload over Iraq - the RAF asked the manufacturer BAE Systems whether the old aircraft would be safe to fly until its replacement came into service in 2010. The company issued its conclusions in August 2004, warning that hot air pipes in the bomb bay were too close to fuel systems and recommending the MoD fit a fire suppression system in the bomb bay.

The MoD ignored the advice. Three months later, ground crew at RAF Kinloss, checking an aircraft back from a training flight, discovered a hot air pipe in the bomb bay had burst, spraying super-heated air directly onto the fuel tank at the base of the starboard wing. An investigation found the air would have been at temperatures between 310°C and 424°C. The spontaneous ignition point of Avtur, the fuel used by the Nimrod, is 260°C.

It was only through good fortune that it occurred when the aircraft was on its way back to base, averting disaster. In the investigation’s report, the station commander at Kinloss warned that with the aircraft already way past its out-of-service date, “the unexpected failure should be ever at the forefront of our minds”. His concerns were widely shared among the RAF officers trying desperately to keep the Nimrods in the air.

The leaked emails reveal frantic efforts to try to stop the fuel leaks as RAF officers scrabbled around various budgets to find funding and turned to civilian companies to fill gaps left by shortages of trained technicians. They begin in early December 2005 and show that XV230, one of only a few capable of sending real-time video to commanders, was also one of two aircraft particularly badly affected by fuel leaks.

The dire problems led the RAF to commission another report, this time from QinetiQ, the private defence company, amid concerns there would not be enough aircraft to cover operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. “The potential knock-on to operations from these fuel leaks is a loss of one electronic optics [video-equipped] aircraft in theatre with the very real possibility of having nothing at all to replace it with,” one officer at Kinloss said.

There was relief verging on jubilation at the discovery that the civilian company MPI had “a crack squad of fuel leak fixers”, which normally worked on civilian airliners, and in February it was called in to work on XV230. A few weeks later, QinetiQ reported the results of its investigation, concluding that the aircraft was simply too old, and being pushed too hard, leading to excessive strain on the airframe. QinetiQ found that “the aggressive tempo with which we are flying the jets in stark temperature shifts is contributing to our leak headache,” one officer noted in an email.

XV230 resumed flying in March. But no sooner had it done so than the leaks returned. In the six months before the explosion, there were more than 50 fuel leaks on Nimrods, at least 12 of them on XV230. During June and July, it was the first RAF aircraft to be put through a new system of “equalized maintenance” designed to save time and money which cured only five of the 12 leaks.

Nevertheless, pressure to deploy the aircraft, and its invaluable real-time video capability, was so intense that it was sent out immediately to Seeb in Oman, where Nimrods flying over Afghanistan are based. The need to fix the seven remaining fuel leaks was deferred until January 2007, by which time the aircraft would have finished its tour in the Gulf.

The explosion confirmed all the worst fears. Immediately, the hot air pipe in the bomb bay and the fuel tank at the base of the starboard wing were taken out of use on the rest of the fleet and within two days they were back up in the air.

Even before the decision was made to start flying again another Nimrod suffered a fuel leak. A Serious Fault Signal in October 2006 reported leaks with three aircraft, one of them the day after the explosion during refueling on the ground. On 13 October, fuel was found to be leaking out of two of the tanks of a Nimrod. It was kept flying with the two tanks put out of use but a week later a third tank burst leaking fuel into the bomb bay.

Then on 8 November, a Nimrod suffered a major leak during mid-air refuelling with hundreds of gallons of fuel running along the fuselage and pouring out of the rear of the aircraft. Pressure built up in the air-to-air refuelling system to twice the normal limit. Fuel flooded the bomb bay, which had to be opened twice to get rid of it. The RAF suspended air-to-air refuelling briefly, introducing new operating procedures limiting which tanks could be used. But a month later, another Nimrod lost nearly 1,000 gallons of fuel as a result of a leak during mid-air refuelling.

Speaking on the runway at RAF Kinloss in September last year, as the families stood on the runway to watch their loved ones brought home, Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy, Chief of Air Staff, described the repatriation ceremony as an important part of the grieving process. It is a process that is unlikely to come to an end until the board of inquiry finally tells those left behind how their sons, partners or fathers died and the inquests have taken place.

The board was expected to give its verdict in June, then September, then next month, now apparently next year. Meanwhile, the fuel leaks continue in their dozens, at least eight of them deemed so serious they have merited air accident investigation reports. Still the crews fly the old aircraft to the same punishing schedule, collecting intelligence over Afghanistan and Iraq, still with “the unexpected failure” at the forefront of their minds.

Read all the Mick Smith blogs on Nimrod XV230

Comments

[Geoff Gray]

What should be noted for future reference is that. Families of service men and women who have died and are subject to a service BoI are allowed to attend and participate in the BoI. At the moment family participation is at the discretion of the BoI president. Last week I was present at a meeting with Derek Twigg M.P. ( Defence Minister ) and the right to involvement of families in BoI was put to him. It was duly noted and we await an outcome on the subject.

[William29]

The British armed forces have over many years been lucky in times of conflict, in that we have always managed to replace acceptable commanders with capable ones, sometimes it took a disaster before this happened. In the modern day where self seeking yes men are prevalent I unfortunately do not see this happening. I could easily be proved wrong - let the chief of air staff boost the morale by flying with the men and women he so readily commits to hostile environs.

[Andy Knight]

It has been said in some quarters that speculation ahead of the publication of the BoI is unhelpful, as Ben Knights brother I would say that it is unhelpful having to wait in excess of 13 months to (maybe) find out how your brother died. I appreciate the need for a thorough investigation I have that desire as do all families involved I believe however there is no excuse for the complete lack of regard for the families, we have effectively been told to sit down, shut up and wait for the BoI.

The information that has been made avaialble through the press in the last few days does not answer many of the questions but it gives an insight into the desperation to get leaking, rusty, 35 year old jets into service in a war zone in one of the most inhospitable regions of the world. This was an accident waiting to happen, the 'can do' mentality allowed it to happen.

You cannot squeeze every penny out of services like the RAF and expect them to maintain the same standards. I repeat previous assertions that the government has blood on their hands. The truth will out!

[william29]

I suspect that whilst these aircraft are still on mission there will be pressure on the board of inquiry to slow things down under the guise of being thorough. Sadly I do not for one moment believe that the truth will out. I will wager that "no one person was responsible". We have all at sometime worked on the "can do" principal, it is admired the world over, yes, with old equipment but not with equipment that is as likely to kill me as the enemy forces are. A spokesman from the MoD is reported as saying "we would not fly them if they were not safe" I took note of the "we" !

[William 29]

On looking through the Nimrod maintainance schedule (equalized maintainance - highlighted in Mick Smiths article above) I noted the following, "has the potential to derive profit increases equal to that of the MoD savings" ! The mechanical engineer in me knows well how this works, as engineers we do like to "over engineer" - with a just in case mentality. This had never gone down well with the money men. Spares are considered to be - money lying on the shelf. So we work on the "in the nick of time principle". Buy it when you need it - or canabalize. Savings are not made on the essential mechanical components- savings are made on risk factors - a component might have failed in x amount of hours - the thinking then is as it is judged low risk - save money and remove it. This rarely happens on civilian aircraft under stricter FAA or CAA rulings.

[edradour]

I think the most difficult aspect of any fatal accident is the need to balance the feelings of the bereaved families with responsible investigative reporting.

In this case, it would seem only one of the families is keen to explore the detail of what went wrong on the day and, more importantly, what preceded it in terms of MoD / Government penny pinching and incompetence leading to an aircraft which was not, it would seem, maintained to the level one would expect or being operated within the bounds of the Safety Case.

I support Mr Knight in his quest. I think he has shown a high degree of sensitivity, except toward the MoD. And why should he be sensitive to their feelings? Yet again, as has been demonstrated at numerous Boards of Inquiry, in their reports and at subsequent Coroners’ Inquests, the MoD has been less than truthful. Mr Knight’s exposure of a series of damning e-mails which (a) the MoD clearly tried to hide from the BoI (which is common practice) or (b) the BoI knew about but were going to conveniently omit from their report (again, common practice) has obviously forced a delay while the MoD backtracks in a desperate attempt at damage limitation.

Given these common practices, and the fact such key evidence is routinely withheld from Coroners, does this not constitute an offence? (“Perverting the course of Justice” or “obstructing the court” – a legal eagle will tell me the right words).

Without the likes of Mr Knight, the truth would be hidden and the risk of an identical accident increase. Very clearly, previous losses could have been avoided, at little or no cost, had the MoD been more open. Yes, there are clear parallels here, and while the other Nimrod families may not be entirely happy with Mr Knight, they should try to console themselves that his actions will help their loved ones colleagues.

[The 3rd Column]

3rd Column
I will put your post up but can you first contact me about it at mick@michaelsmithwriter.com Your peter pan email doesnt work!

[William 29]

Perverting the course of justice to you and me - crown immunity to them.

[william 29]

On looking through my late fathers diary (1942 Westen Desert) I find on a memo page the following ZX-M port outer jammed A/C U/S. That a Corporal Fitter/Armourer could declare an aircraft unserviceable in time of conflict says it all .