Sorry Jock. The UK Has Failed in Basra!

It is sadly not true to say, as the Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, does in an interview with The Times today, that British troops have not failed in Basra. It was not just the government that was suggesting our troops could do something worthwhile in Iraq’s most southern city, it was British military commanders themselves. Too often, we heard that UK troops were better than their US colleagues at winning hearts and minds and that we could do something in the south that our American allies had no hope of doing further north.

Stirrup’s words were pretty poorly chosen. It is of course true that British troops have not been defeated in the south. As part of the coalition, they removed Saddam, which was the original aim of the invasion. They have now brought the situation in the south to a point where it can be handed over to Iraqi control. Over the next few months, we are about to fulfill our obligation as occupiers under the Geneva Conventions to leave once the country has been restored to a point where it can protect its own borders and govern itself.

But while technically it is not a defeat, it certainly looks like one, and if it is not to be judged a failure then Stirrup is setting some very poor standards indeed. The initial claims that the British had more chance of turning southern Iraq into a better place, both as a result of the fact that it is largely Shia and because of the British troops’ years of experience in dealing successfully with counter-insurgency campaigns were correct. Unfortunately, the troops and their commanders were ham-strung from the very start by interference from London.

Initially, that took the form of a lack of sufficient troops. The unpopularity of the war made the Blair government eager to get as many troops home as possible, while Geoff Hoon’s 2004 defence cuts axed three infantry battalions at a stroke, adding to the problems an army already cut to the bone had in providing sufficient troops. Out on patrol with the Black Watch in Basra in May 2003, I was surprised at the number of ordinary Iraqi men who asked why no troops patrolled at night when the “bad guys” came out taking what they could get at the point of a gun.

The failure to put out sufficient patrols at night - caused by a shortage of troops - was one of the main problems for the coalition across Iraq. In the south, it forced ordinary honest Iraqis, who initially welcomed British troops, into the hands of the militias as their only form of protection. The other main problem was not the disbandment of the Iraqi army, which had largely disbanded itself, but the removal of anyone who knew how to run anything in Iraq under the foolish US-imposed de-Baathication campaign.

As the British struggled to get the city working again in a relatively organised fashion, the militias fought for control. Needing to get rid of British troops first, and assisted by the Iranians, they used roadside bombs, laid at night when there were few if any patrols around, to make life difficult for the British during the day.

Towards the end of 2005, as the numbers of troops killed rose to the symbolic 100 point, and with the unpopularity of the Iraq War at an all-time high, the Blair government persuaded commanders to ease back on patrols in an attempt to put off the inevitable. British troops made only those journeys that were necessary. They lost control of the streets and despite an attempt at the end of 2006 and beginning of 2007 in Operation Sinbad, to regain the initiative, the power of the militias, and in particular the Mahdi Army, the Jaish al-Mahdi or JAM, was now unstoppable.

Cleverly orchestrated by Iran, they were able to attack UK troops on the ground with roadside bombs and in their barracks with rockets and mortars. The Iranians kept this under tight control, at one point passing the JAM just one highly sophisticated surface-to-air missile to shoot down a Royal Navy helicopter and, having made their point, refusing to send any more that might invite retaliation. The arrest of 15 British sailors and marines added to the impression of Iranian superiority.

The firm and deliberate impression was given that Iran and the militias were driving British troops out. Was this a fair impression? British military commanders continued to pursue their obligations, bringing Iraqi troops up to the level where they could take over. They could have made strong arguments that the Iraqi troops were ready a year ago and begun withdrawing then, before the militias power reached the level it did this summer when Moqtada al-Sadr declared a ceasefire that was more welcome to the British than to some of his own men. Far from being driven out, British troops have stayed far longer than they needed to.

They have not been defeated in Basra, but they have certainly not improved their reputation. Is that the fault of the British troops on the ground? No it isn’t. Could they have succeeded given enough troops and no interference from the politicians? We shall never know sadly. But what we do know, and what we must accept, is that they certainly failed to achieve the original aims of winning hearts and minds in Basra and no amount of denying that fact will change it.

Comments

[Chuck Unsworth]

Stirrup is being disingenuous. He cannot say that British troops 'have not failed' in Basra without elaborating on what they were actually required to do. What was their purpose?

It's obvious that at the start of hostilities there was a military objective, but as has been so often said, there was no plan at all for what might happen on cessation of aggression. In conventional military terms campaign plans tend to finish at the point of consolidation of positions. Once that point is reached you must either move to the next military action or move to normalisation.

In my view it took many months before it became clear that there was no post-consolidation plan. And, much worse, in the interim no political strategy was formulated. Without clear political objectives the British military campaign was bound to stagnate and, ultimately, lead to a withdrawal with precious little achieved. Most people recognise that complete withdrawal is virtually impossible. Even if it were to take place the situation remains so volatile that it could quite easily lapse into full-scale civil war.

All of this is a direct reflection of the complete lack of political foresight on both sides of the Atlantic. One has to admire Stirrup's vainglorious attempt to put the best possible spin on events, but no one with any sense believes a single word of it.

[The 3rd Column]

Difficult for any nation to admit that its military failed in its 'mission' let alone when that nation's military are supposed to be made up of professionals, i.e., the UK's.

I agree with Mick that UK has failed in Basra.

We could say say that the failure was bound to happen when we know that the invasion of Iraq was virtually ill prepared and was undertaken for all the wrong reasons.

Under the circumstances, I do believe the UK has done everything it could -- time for UK troops to return home, to recover so they could fight a good fight another day. We should let the Iraqis do things for themselves this time around.

[William 29]

So many flowers of the forest cut down in full bloom, for what ? The ego of a politician who wished to strut around on the world stage, combined with a CGS who appeared to relish the chance to make his name before retirement. History (unfashionable as it is today) tells us that sometimes it is better to leave well alone. I believe that any failure of tactics can be explained by lack of manpower and equipment, strategic failure must be laid at the top table. My admiration for the the young service people is unlimited.