New Safety Fears Over the RAF's Nimrod Spy Planes

Having taken a rest over the Christmas, this blog is back with some more bad news on the Nimrod front. A new document, obtained under the freedom of information act, shows that the reassurances given about the safety of the Nimrod fleet by Defence Secretary Des Browne last month, when the board of inquiry finally reported, were just a tad too optimistic.

When Browne took over as Defence Secretary from that old Marxist rottweiller John Reid, the forces swiftly dubbed him Swiss Tony after the used car salesman in TV’s The Fast Show. I personally feel that was a bit unfair. Browne is a decent and honourable man, as he showed with his apology last month to the families of the 14 men killed when Nimrod XV230 fell apart over Afghanistan in September 2006. But it is clear he and his advisers were not aware of all the facts.

Brown cited an investigation by QinetiQ, the defence contractor, which in April last year carried out a comprehensive fuel system fire hazard analysis of the Nimrod fleet and cleared it as safe. “QinetiQ has conducted an independent investigation into the fuel system and confirmed that, in light of the measures taken since the crash, the fuel system is safe to operate,” Browne told MPs.

Certainly, the hot air pipes that lead back through the bomb bay to the rear of the aircraft, including the exposed section that is believed to have started the fire on board XV230, have been isolated and cannot do any more damage. But the fuel leaks have not stopped and other parts of the hot air piping that could also set fire to fuel cannot be isolated. These flow through the engine bay areas and remain in place. It is here that the continuing problem lies, and it is a very worrying problem indeed.

The problem is highlighted in a newly obtained report compiled by the Nimrod manufacturer BAE Systems in February last year. It was obtained under the freedom of information act by retired Nimrod engineering officer Jimmy Jones and is quite separate from the QinetiQ report cited by Browne. The report gives the results of a series of tests on Nimrod hot air pipes.

The tests were carried out as a result of a incident back in November 2004, when the same section of pipe that is now being blamed for the loss of XV230 split open under pressure, pouring superheated air onto the No 7 fuel tank, the same tank that caught fire on XV230. As a result of the inquiry into the earlier incident, BAE systems was asked to examine a number of sample sections of hot air piping taken from two Nimrod aircraft. The results were extremely worrying.

BAE Systems technicians found widespread corrosion to the pipes, 14 of which had cracks while seven others suffered from severe corrosion. Many of these are in the pipework that has been isolated and are therefore not a safety concern. They no longer operate in flight so they cannot cause any problems in flight. But the worst corrosion problems occurred with two pipes from the engine bay areas which are still in use and which failed under “low pressure”.

In a previous report, BAE Systems warned that these pipes were too close to fuel lines (they are also in the area where the Nimrod suffers most fuel leaks). A failure of the pipes would be likely to lead to a “catastrophic” failure leading to the loss of the aircraft, BAE Systems said.

The board of inquiry into the loss of XV230 found that insufficient attention had been given to the inherent dangers of hot air piping that was too close to key areas of the fuel system, which is one of the reasons Browne apologised. It is therefore worrying to see the apparent lack of attention given to this new report. It does not for example appear to have been seen by the board of inquiry investigating XV230.

One of the sections of hot air pipes which were already cracked was the junction leading to the hot air pipe that set fire to leaking fuel on board XV230. The board of inquiry specifically refers to this junction in its report. “The junction (in the starboard side on the bomb bay) is immediately below the entrance from the bomb bay to the starboard No.7 fuel tank dry bay [where the fire started],” it says. So the junction is a key part of the hot air system suspected of setting fire to the leaking fuel and in the right area to do so.

But the board of inquiry does not mention that BAE Systems found a crack in this junction. Although it does refer to the BAE tests on two separate occasions, both of which make clear that it believes the tests have yet to be completed. Yet the results of the BAE Systems investigation were published on 28 February when the board of inquiry was still months away from concluding its report. Why on earth did the board of inquiry not see the results of the BAE Systems tests and, given the problems with the hot air pipes in the engine bay areas, why on earth does Des Browne think this aircraft is now safe?

Comments

[William29]

I have done a bit of metal bashing in the aircraft industry mostly privately built replicas. The CAA are nothing if not totally thorough and indeed professional. It would be a wise move in my view if the CAA
had oversight of military aircraft both in design authority and maintainance through a military aircraft division of the CAA.

[Chuck Unsworth]

Mick

Welcome back.

It's not a question of what Browne thinks about Nimrod. His responses and actions are based entirely on political necessities.

The BOI has failed in its duty to clearly establish the cause of the failures. That is reprehensble. The question is was this deliberate?

So the choice is of collusion or incompetence.

[william29]

BAe must of course accept part of the blame, shareholders aside, as the design authority they could withdraw a permit to fly, as indeed the Civil Aviation Authority would promptly do in the case of civil avaition. Nimrods do overfly civilian areas, last summer one flew over Southampton at a very low altitude, some ten minutes after the Lancaster - a case of age before beauty, my own view was the Lancaster won on both counts.

[martin]

Hi Mick,

I think this is great what you're doing here. Someone needs to speak out.

There's a petition on the PMs site;

http://petitions.pm.gov.uk/supportforces/

It has received over 600 signatures in just over 2 months, not bad considering we're aiming for 1000 in the near future.

I think people are becoming increasingly frustrated by the contempt that the government is treating the Armed Forces with.

Good luck..

[William29]

Pilot Officer HRH Billy Wales - Nimrod Driver ? Have my doubts !

[william29]

Previously I stated that BAe could have withdrawn the permit to fly, I could not have been more wrong ! In a publication (JSP553) (Googled) I now learn that the Design Authority is allocated to a least 4 different organisations- The S of S for defence included. The classic legal get out clause - no one organisation can been held responsible. Just watch how quickly the CAA/Accident investigators come up with answers for the 777 incident at Heathrow.

I Remain,

Dumbfounded!

[The 3rd Column]

Brown is an expert at defence budget cuts - suggest inking a manifacturing agreement with China?

[w29]

Shendung Fighters for the RAF - no chance - The Health and Safety Exec will impound them on arrival - bound to be lead in the paint !

[w29]

The Airworthiness Competencies Set

1. Mil a/c are operated under the Crown prerogative, not under statute. In operating mil a/c the MOD is subject to a LEGAL DUTY of care, therefore, it has a responsibility to ENSURE that its regulatory system is no less effective than the system operated fo the regulation of civil a/c under the civil aviation act 1982. And the Air Navigation Order. To achieve this , it is essential MOD identifies and utilises COMPETENT personnel, in areas where decisions affect HUMAN LIFE and/or equipment loss. This principle is already enshrined for Airworthiness in JSP553.

Extract from the above titled document.

The Highlighting is mine.

[The 3rd Column]

W29,

Right you are! Bound to have problems too with manuals in Chinese.

[W29]

Manuals in Chinese - no problems, anyone who can understand MOD speak (JSP553) will breeze through Chinese !

[edradour]

Airworthiness Competencies and Design Authorities

Quite right, W29. I think you'll find the failure to impelement these regulations is a major reason why Browne had to admit liability (and in doing so wholly contradicted his junior colleagues, past and present, Ingram and Ainsworth).

MoD have excellent processes and procedures for appointing and managing Design Authorities, BUT they don't fund the implementation. Before blaming the likes of BAeS, one should always ask if their appointment as Aircraft Design Authority was complemented by a properly funded contract to fulfill their duties. The answer is almost certainly NO.

The discipline therefore becomes a lost art, and the competencies have been largely lost.

[w29]

Dear Eradour, I am sadly not convinced that the MOD qualifies to achieve an excellent rating in anything it does (with the obvious exception of the free laptops for all campaign - ongoing) I did not wish to blame Bae, and indeed should have made a better point, of course all, right down to the aircraft commander/groundcrew could effectively cease flying by the form 700, I suspect the consequences would be swift ! With a Courts Martial or two !

[edradour]

William

I understand, and the incompetence of many in the MoD has not been in doubt for many years.

However, it has to be said that for every procurement failure we read of there are many more programmes, some extremely complex, that are delivered on time, to cost and with the desired performance. If one were to study WHY these were successful it would be seen that the excellent procedures I mentioned have been followed but, critically, the people responsible had both the resources and the experience to realise that the procedures can and must be adapted for each situation. To follow too rigidly is to court disaster.

And then, having delivered one has to maintain the kit while in-service. Again, this requires resource and experience. This is where Nimrod suffered. The lack of resource is well known. Successive Governments have starved the MoD of funds to the extent that maintaining kit - and in the case of aircraft that means airworthiness - is largely ignored. And the dilution of experience means that MoD don't appreciate the peculiar problems and higher costs associated with maintaining an elderly aircraft whose mainplanes (in particular) were designed before the advent of CAD, and were hand built in small sections, as opposed to modern one-piece construction. And numerous small sections need joined together. And joints become corroded, weaken and leak (in this case, fuel). This needs money to maintain and, while many on Nimrod understand this, the MoD is full of people who don't understand as there is no equivalent problem on modern aircraft. And it is the latter who decide how much resource is allocated.

You are correct about the action that would be taken against anyone below Air rank who dared try to ground the aircraft, or even reported problems. Their career would be at an end or severely stalled. Given your previous post, perhaps the answer is an airworthiness authority independent of the MoD.

Best wishes

[military news]

It is obvious that they aren't safe. Why don't they just build a whole new a/c which is more efficient and rectifies the problem.

Perhaps one day, in maybe a decade, the A380 could become an aircraft tanker!

Regards
Tom
www.military-world.net

[WIlliam29]

Dear Eradour - Indeed ! Very few aircraft have been designed that have been capable of true multi role - maybe the Mosquito qualifies. The modern one size fits all has oft proved a folly, continued attempts to upgrade an airframe that is 1940/50s technology is wasteful in money and keeping industry at the cutting edge. It is of course nothing new in British engineering, after leaving the regular army and going back to engineering, I was presented with an Avro drawing circa 1929 (this was in 1982) a component still used on the (much later designed)venerable Shackleton ! An a/c known in the trade as ten thousand rivets flying in close formation. As for the dilution of experience this is a fact that is also shown to be a problem in the railways and other industries. There appears to be a belief that if the engineering people give a view it is seen as -pulling the wool over the eyes and costly,

Sir

I remain etc....

[WIlliam29]

Further to my last : A camel is a horse designed by committee !